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RESPONSES TO 'filE 'I,EN QUESTIONS
Robert Knowlest
8.

DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED
STATES?

10.

WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S
NUMBER-oNE POWER?

The United Stat~s cannot effectively pursue its national security interests without taking into account its unique position in the
world. How powerful is the United States? Is it an empire? Is its
influence in decline? Who are its major rivals? And who or
what represents an existential threat?
These questions are crucial for U.S. national security law as
well, but their importance is often overlooked. Debates about the
scope of executive power in foreign affairs are framed as necessity
versus the rule of law. The political branches establish a foreign
policy and the means of p.u rsuing it, and the President does what is
necessary to protect the nation. The courts' task is not to determine what works. It is to decide whether, and how much, to constrain the exercise of power if the law requires it.
The result is a very high level of deference by the courts to the
executive branch in national security cases. Even compelling constitutional values like liberty and due process can seem like abstractions in light of the urgent, concrete need to protect the nation.
And if those whom the Government acts against such as noncitizens captured and detained abroad have no connection to U.S.
society, the courts are likely to defer even more. When the Constitution was drafted and ratified, America pursued neutrality to avoid
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1

all entanglements with stronger European powers. In this context,
could the Framers have intended for the rights enumerated in the
Constitution to apply to everyone, everywhere in the world? Would
the public have interpreted the language this wayi~
The world has changed, of course. The United States is no
longer a weak power, but at least for now the strongest power.
And it plays a very different role in the world today than it did at
the end of the eighteenth century. The Constitution's original
meaning to the extent we can discern it still matters. But where
original meaning and history are indeterminate, courts and scholars turn to functionalism to decide the appropriate allocation of
power among the branches in national security cases. Functionalism is about what works. Effectiveness in national security law, as in
national security policy, depends on taking into account how the
United States relates to the rest of the world.
It may seem strange that views of international relations should
affect the courts' views of its role. But the impact has been there, if
usually unarticulated, since at least the early twentieth century. In
perhaps the most influential foreign affairs decision, Curtiss-Wright,
the Supreme Court connected the nature of the world a "vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems" to relaxed constraints on delegations of power to
3
the President. Curtiss-Wright, which is still cited by the Government
to justify broad executive power in foreign affilirs, was decided
against the backdrop of a world in crisis, with Nazi Germany and
4
Imperial japan on the rise and World War II just three years away.
Since 9/11, scholars applying functional approaches have tended
to conclude that terrorism represents a danger justifying greater
5
deference by the courts to the President. Transnational terrorist
1. HENRY KissiNGER, DIPLOMACY 32-36 (1994).
2. See generally J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. LJ. 463 (2007) (arguing from history and the text and structure of the Constitution that noncitizens abroad lack constitutional rights).
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
4. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL ORDER 8c IMPERIAL AMBmoN 150-51
(2006).
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE TifE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CiviL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 101-0S (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN 1HE BALANCE: SECURI1Y, LIBERlY, AND THE COURTS 180-81
(2007). But s• Robert Knowles, American R
and tM Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARiz. ST. LJ. 87 (2009) (applying international relations theory to theseparation of powers and concluding that courts should not give special deference
to the executive branch in foreign affairs cases); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Furm and
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groups such as al Qaeda are labeled an existential threat equivalent
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan during World War II. Now, as then, an unstable
world requires the speed, expertise, secrecy, and uniformity found
only in the executive branch. The federal cottrts, by contrast, move
slowly, lack special foreign affairs expertise, and rarely reach uniform decisions.
But al Qaeda is a far different enemy from Nazi Germany.
Though al Qaeda has enjoyed the support of governments at one
time or another, it draws recruits and financial support from all
over the world. It operates across borders. Unlike a nation-state, it
does not sign treaties or possess sovereignty. It has no army in the
traditional sense and cannot conquer territory. It does not operate
a government or embassies. These differences matter for the way
courts should view their role in national security cases.
It is important for courts to be aware of American power because it determines how the United States interacts with the rest of
the world. In the 1930s, the world was divided into spheres of influence by great powers with roughly equal economic and military
capability. During the Cold War, the United States vied with the
Soviet Union for dominance. Since 1991, however, the United
States has been the only nation capable of projecting military force
anywhere in the world. Debates have raged for decades about how
to measure America's power and how to describe the international
system.
The United States has been labeled the lone superpower, a
7
6
8
·
Th ese descnptions
··
h yperpower, a h egemon, an d an empire.
have long co-existed with predictions of more or less imminent U.S.
9
decline. During the 1980s, for example, scholars complained
Function in the National &curity Constitution, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 1549 (2009) (using
organization theory to argue that a functional approach to the separation of powers in national security cases requires more court supervision).
6. See, e.g., Eliot A Cohen, History and the Hyperpower, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug.
2004, at 49, 49.
7. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: PounCAL MORAI.IIY IN A
ONE-SUPERPOWER WORI .n (1994) (arguing that American hegemony is a form of
international governance and must be evaluated by liberals in the same way they
would evaluate the legitimacy of domestic political arrangements).
8. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, Wha(s at Stake in the American Empire
Debate, 101 AM. PoL. Sa. REv. 253, 253 (2007) (observing that scholars on both the
left and right describe the United States as an empire); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S.
Power and Strategy After Iraq, FoREIGN AFF.,july-Aug. 2003, at 60, 60 (same).
9. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FAil. OF 1HE GRFAT POWERS: ECONOMIC
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about U.S. imperialisrn in Central America while concluding that
Japan's economic strength would allow it to surpass the United
States as the world's preeminent power. During the 1990s, realist
international-relations scholars began to struggle with understanding the behavior of nations in the unipolar system that had replaced the bipolar Cold War system. In the first half of the 2000s,
the already vast United States-as-empire literature bloomed on both
ends of the political spectrum, in part as a response to the more
aggressive foreign policies of the Bush administration following
10
9/11. During the second half of the decade, however, the narrative of U.S. decline and the rise of its rivals again gained momenn
tum.
Many of these disagreements result from semantic differenc12
es and a loose use of the term "empire." In addition, assessments
of the U.S. global position will vary, depending on the importance
1
one places, respectively, on military, economic, and soft power. s
But as measured in terms of military power, the United States still
predominates. It accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology
14
that far outstrip would-be competitors. No other great power has
15
possessed such a relative advantage in modern history. This advantage is so vast that it will likely prevent rivals from counterbalancing the United States on a global scale for decades.
America's advantage is compounded by other factors. First,
the United States enjoys geographic isolation from its major poten-

MnlTARY CoNFLicr FROM 1500 TO 2000 514 (Vintage Books 1989)
(1987) (predicting the decline of the United States); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 392 (2001) (arguing that regional hegemons
will arise to challenge American dominance).
10. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE
(2004);
RS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MIUTARISM, SECRECY, AND lHE
END OF TilE REPUBUC (2004).
11. See, e.g., PARAG KHANNA, THE SECOND WORLD: EMPIRES AND INFl.UENCE IN
1HE NE\V GLOBAL ORDER (2008); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORlD
(2008).
12. Nexon & Wright, supra note 8, at 253.
13. See Nye, supra note 8 (observing that the United States occupies a different global position with respect to military, economic, and soft power). For many
realists, soft power is least important, if it can even be considered a form of power
at all. See MF'..ARsHEIMER, supra note 9, at 5 (defining power in military terms).
14.
, supra note 11, at 181-82.
15. See William C. Wohlforth, Tl~e Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 INT'L
SECURilY 5 (1999) (observing that America's military's advantage is larger now
than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system).
CHANGE AND
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tial rivals including China, Russia, Europe, and India who are
16
located relatively near one another in Eurasia. This mutes the security threat that the U~ited. States seems to pose while increasinR
the threats that potenual nvals seem to pose to one another.
Second, because unipolarity is now entrenched as the status quo,
nations seeking to counter-balance the United States must overcome free-rider problems in order to do so. Third, nuclear weapons make the concentration of power in the United States appear
less threatening. Just as other powers cannot conquer the United
States, they, too, cannot be conquered. This makes war between
great powers in today's world much less likely and reinforces the
18
stability of the international order. Finally, globalization the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures19
also tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict.
While in military terms the world remains unipolar for now,
the picture is more complicated when it comes to economic and
soft power. The gross domestic product of the Eurozone now exceeds that of the United States. Although 2007 projections had the
U.S. economy remaining substantially larger than China's for the
next two decades, China will overtake the United States in some
measures such as manufacturing output before then. Some also
believe that China's large investment in U.S. currency above $1
trillion (more than twenty percent of total foreign-held U.S. Treasury securities) in 2009 gives it leverage over the United States
20
and constrains U.S. foreign policy.
America's soft power the
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion
21
or payments is much harder to measure. Global regard for the
16. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See ZAKARIA, supra note 11, at 81-86.
17. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, International &lations Tlteory
and the Case Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter
Brooks & Wohlfarth, Unilateralism].
18. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing,
30 INT'LSECURI1Y72, 106 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlforth, Hard Tinw].
19. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism an.d Empire: Logics of Order in the American
Unipolar Age, 30 REv. OF INT'L S1UD. 609, 617 (2004).
20. China's ownership of U.S. debt can also be seen as limiting China's options, however, because China owns far too much in U.S. currency to sell off a significant amount without reducing the value of its remaining dollar-dominated assets. See ~ AYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE,
7

CHINA'S HOLDINGS OF

U.S.

SECURITIES: IMPUCATIONS FOR THE

U.S. ECONOMY 9

(2009).
21. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN \\70RLD
Pouncs (2004) (observing that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a
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U.S. Government's policies waxes and wanes, and varies a great deal
from region to region. United States culture remains highly in~
fluential. Global public opinion of the United States improved
during 2009, but the degree that this measures soft power is uncer22
tain. But it is the relative decline in economic and soft power that
has led m'a ny scholars to conclude that the world is now multipolar.
These measures of U.S. power do not tell the whole story,
however. The United States plays a unique role in the world. It
23
provides a number of global public goods. These include security
guarantees, the_protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets.24 Because of its ovetwhelming military might, the Unite-d

States possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of
2

force. · This prevents other nations from launching wars large
enough to truly destabilize the international system. Mter World
War II, the United States forge_d a system of military alliances that
still preseiVe stability around the world. The United States provides
security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a
26
strong military presence in Asia and Europe. The United States
also provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism
27
and confront rogue states_. ' In the economic realm, the United
States supports crucial underpinnings for the system of global
trade. The U.S. dollar is still the world's reserve currency. The
United States led efforts to create the World Trade Organization
and other institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
country's culture, political ideals, and policies).
22. See PEw GLOBAL A'rilTUDES PROJECI', CONFIDENCE IN 0BAMA LIFTS U.S.
IMAGE

AROUND

THE

WORLD

(July

23,

2009),

available

at

http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportiD=264.
23. Public goods are "nonrivalrous" capable of being simultaneously consumed by the provider and others and "nonexcludable" impossible to keep
others from consu-m ing. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law
Be Part of Our Law 7, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1175,. 1236 (2007).

-24.

MICHAEL MANDELMUM, THE CAsE FOR GoLIA1H: HOW AMERICA ACIS AS 'nJE
WORLD'S GoVERNMENT IN lHE TwENIY-FlRST CENTURY 34-62 (2005) (describing the

public goods -p rovided by the United States for the world).
'25. Ikenberry, supra note· 19, at 618 ("The· United States possesses a quasimonopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and
behaviors of states are increasingly open to global that is, American scrutiny/').
26. I d. at 609.
27. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM,_supra note 24,_at 163 (observing that forceful U.S.
measures to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted Europe and China to adopt more conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also
TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COIJ.ECITVE ACl'ION 144-61 (2004) (applying public goods
theory to the control of rogue states).
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and the World Bank that remain in place today. The United
States does not produce these global public goods from altruism: as
the largest consumer of these goods, it benefits from them the
most.
Of course, the United States supplies these public goods imperfectly. Pirates prey on shipping in some places (often with impunity), and rogue states continue to develop nuclear weapons~
And while the United States intervened to stop human rights viola28
tions in some instances, such as ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it took
29
no action with respect to others, like the genocide in Rwanda.
Moreover, there are many important global public goods such as
addressing ··weakest-link" collective-action problems like climate
30
change that the United States cannot provide- alone. Nonetheless, no other nation currently has the capacity to provide these
goods. Were the United States to withdraw from its globalgovernance role, chaos would result. As the largest public-goods
consumer, the United States would suffer the _most.
The difficulty is that other nations frequently resent the outsized role that the United States plays in international affairs. Why
should the United States enjoy the b_e nefits of having the dollar as
the world's reserve currency when the Eurozone has a_larger GDP?
The vast overseas military presence required to provide security
guarantees, and the combat operations required to fight terrorism
and confront rogue states, inevitably result in blowback. The 2003
Iraq invasion brought the relative power of the United States into
stark relief and contributed to weariness of American power.
On the other hand, other nations seem unwilling, for now at
least, to relinquish the benefits that come from U.S. leadership.
Germany and Japan, for example, can focus on developing their
economies rather than their militaries, confident that the United
States will p_rovide security. When China holds U.S. dollars, it can
export manufacturing goods to the United States more cheaply.

See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. &
MARYL. REv. 1683, 1690 (2000) C'Military action to aid the Kosovar Albanians was
the right thing to do.")-; Ruth ~7edgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.
INT'LL. 828, 828 (1999) (noting that NATO's action in Kosovo "may also mark the
emergence of a limited and conditional right of humanitarian intetvention" in international law).
29. SeeS
. POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HEIJ.: AMERICA AND 1HE AGE OF
GENOCDE (2003).
30. See Paul G~ Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime
Failure, 47 NAT. REsOURCES J. 195 (2007).
28.
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And while few other nations are willing to invest blood and treasure
to combat terrorism in Mghanistan, most nations enjoy the benefits
of keeping al Qaeda at bay.
But there is another reason why other nations are willing to
bandwagon with, rather than seek to counter-balance, the United
States. They have a voice in American government, which provides
multiple access points. Foreign citizens, corporations, and governments can lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the
State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Deparunents, where for31
eign policy is made. Even f'rogue states" such as Myanmar have
32
their lobbyists in Washington. They use the media to broadcast
their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decisionmakers.33 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants,
many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of af34
fecting foreign policy. The courts, too, are accessible to foreign
nations and non-citizens, whose involvement in U.S. litigation
grows larger each year. The benefit of multiple access points is that
if one fails, another can be tried: foreign governments facing unfavorable court decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through
political channels.
It is the uniqueness, rather than just the level, of American
power that has led some to label the United States as an empire.
But the label does not really fit. Empires consist of a "rimless-huband-spoke structure," with an imperial core the preeminent
state ruling the periphery through intermediaries.~ The United
States is very powerful and maintains a military presence throughout the world. The Status of Force Agreements ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and
36
others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided.
31. The post-Cold War era has seen an acceleration in the trend that began in
the mid-1970s, away from foreign policy conducted by an elite group within the
executive branch toward one involving a much broader community. See John T.
Tierney, Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy, in
CONGRESS RESURGENT 89,95-98 (Randall B. Ripley &James M. Lindsay eds., 1993).
32. Michael Isikoff, Mac's Convention Quandary~, NE\VSWEEK, May 19, 2008, at 5.
33. See MANDEI.BAUM, supra note 24, at 165.
34. McGinnis 8c Somin, supra note 23, at 1245.
35. Nexon 8c Wright, supra note 8, at 258.
36. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base
Agreements, 14 U. Ml&\fi INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 6 (2006) (''\\7ith great consistency,
the United States has ... leveraged its international power to obtain base agreements that heavily favor U.S. interests over those of receiving states.").
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And the United States performs many global-governance functions.
But it does not rule other nations. Although the United States may
exercise pseudo-imperial influence in a few nations like Iraq and
Mghanistan, ••empire" does not describe the relationship between
the United States and the rest of the world.
Moreover, stability in empires depends on the imperial core
keeping nations on the periphery from communicating with one
another and forming alliances. All roads must lead to Rome. Although many roads lead to Washington, it would be impossible for
the United States to maintain imperial rule in an era of globalization, even if it wanted to. The United States simply lacks sufficient
control over the flow of information. When the United States
strikes a bargain with one nation, others know about it immediately. The SOFAs with Iraq and Mghanistan are the subject of much
public debate. When things go awry with the exercise of American
military might as with Guantanamo, secret prisons, and Abu
Ghraib the world pays attention. And other powers, such as China, have formed their own relationships with nations across the
globe.
In the end, the label for America's role probably does not matter as much as the reality. How should courts take cognizance of
this reality? There are two important consequences for the U.S.
separation of powers. First, the unipolar nature of the international system puts the United States at the center of the action in world
affairs. The stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on
successful functioning of the U.S. Government as a whole than it
does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing
realpolitik. "[W] orld power politics are shaped primarily . . . by the
37
foreign policy developed in Washington." For better or worse, the
laws that will be applied in combating terrorism worldwide will be
in large- measure the laws domestic and international that the
U.S. Government chooses to apply.
Second, unipolarity increases the power of the U.S. executive
branch, which faces fewer external constraints than it would in a
38
world with several great powers balancing one another militarily.
This became especially apparent with America's post-9/11 detention policies. At one time, the executive branch faced much more
37. Campbell Craig, American Realism Versus American Imperialism, 57 WORI.D
POL 143, 169 (2004).
38. Daniel Abe be, Great Power Politics and the Structure of £qreign Relations Law,
10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 125, 125 (2009).
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exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with international law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United
States strayed too far from established norms, it would risk retaliation upon its own soldiers or other sanctions from powerful rivals.
Today, there are few such constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are
not great powers in the traditional sense and are not likely to obey
international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American
rule-breaking will undermine the legitimacy of U.S. leadership.
America's military predominance enables it to set the rules of the
game. When the United States breaks its own rules, it loses legitimacy.
With U.S. legitimacy at stake, it follows that courts should be
more, not less; active in national security cases. Courts are widely
regarded as rule-based institutions, rather than political institutions, that can ensure that the political branches do not shortcircuit processes for changing the law or act to violate fundamental
constitutional principles.. The approval of courts lends legitimacy
to government action. When other nations see the, United States
following the law, they are more likely to acquiesce in U.S. leadership. This makes this task of providing global public goods such
as fighting terrorism easier for the United States. As the largest
public-goods consumer, the United States benefits the most from
perceptions of its own legitimacy.
Legitimacy becomes especially important in view of declining
U.S .. influence relative to other powers. The world may not be multi-polar today, but it could be by mid-century. America's enormous
military advantage will decrease over time, and its reduced share of
global economic output will .give it less ability to throw its weight
around. Although the costs for the United States of disregarding
international legal norms may seem worth it now, those costs will
increase from year-to-year. To the extent that international institutions including frameworks of international law provide some
"stickiness," the United States is better off investing its own legiti,macy in these institutions now, while it has maximum influence. If
the United States leaves its imprint on international law an,d institutions, they will be less costly for the United States to comply with in
the future and much more cosdy for a rising rival, such as China, to
•
tgnore.
Nonetheless, there are some who argue that we are already living in a multi-polar world, and that rogue states and terrorist
groups like al Qaeda are our true rivals. Advances in technology
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will if they do not already enable terrorists or rogue states to
deploy small nuclear and biological weapons to threaten American
cities, making up in sheer mayhem what they lack in armies and
navies. A nuclear explosion in a large metropolitan area such as
New York has the potential to change life as we know it. In this
9
sense, al Qaeda can be viewed as an existential threat.5
However, the capacity for small groups to leverage extremism
into great destruction does not alter the fundamental structure of
geopolitics. Not all existential threats are the same. A nuclear device would be just as dangerous in the hands of a domestic group
or a lone wolf as it would be in the hands of al Qaeda. It would be
a mistake to assume that these new threats are best pursued by giving the executive branch greater deference. In fact, the dangers
from terrorism make even clearer the need to adhere to established principles. The United States will occupy a global leadership
role for decades to come. Successful management of global crises including a catastrophic terrorist attack lies not in counterbalancing rivals, but in better management of the international system. The United States cannot hope to tackle large-scale global
problems terrorism especially if the rest of the world loses confidence in American leadership. The best way for courts to help
carry out this task is to ensttre that the political branches adhere to
the rule of law.

See PHIUP BOBBirl', TERROR AND CONSENT: THEWARS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 201-02 (2008) (stating that an existential threat ••is precisely the sort of
threat that terror poses"). But see Fareed Zakaria, True or False: We Need a Wartime
President, NE\YSWEEK, July 14, 2008, at 48 (rejecting arguments that al Qaeda or
Iran represent existential threats to the United States).
39.

